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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the evidence base that underpins contemporary approaches to the 
resolution of violent conflict, in an effort to improve the lives of conflict-affected 
populations. By means of a systematic literature review the paper explores academic 
work as well as grey literature that engages with the experiences of the “end-users” of 
conflict resolution efforts. It finds that current approaches to conflict resolution are 
often based on weak evidence and normative objectives, and make problematic 
assumptions with regard to the actors and conflict structures involved, and to the 
conflict resolution strategies employed. It concludes by highlighting the need to 
strengthen the evidence base of conflict research if conflict resolution practice is to be 
brought into line with empirical realities. 
 
  
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Evolving approaches to ‘conflict resolution’ ...................................................................................... 2 
Paper overview ................................................................................................................................... 3 
Database-driven searches ........................................................................................................... 3 
Journal searches: search terms and criteria ....................................................................................... 7 
Limitations .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
Conceptualisations of conflict ............................................................................................................ 9 
Quantifying conflict and/or violence ................................................................................................ 12 
Governance .............................................................................................................................. 14 
Conceptualisations of governance ................................................................................................... 14 
Hybrid governance and local dynamics ............................................................................................ 15 
Criminality and war economies ........................................................................................................ 18 
Actors ....................................................................................................................................... 19 
Role and legitimacy of international actors ..................................................................................... 19 
Role and legitimacy of civil society ................................................................................................... 20 
Grassroots participation ................................................................................................................... 21 
Participation of women .................................................................................................................... 21 
Reintegration of conflict actors ........................................................................................................ 23 
Justice and reconciliation ......................................................................................................... 25 
Justice as an all-encompassing tool .................................................................................................. 26 
Equating justice and reconciliation .................................................................................................. 27 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 28 
The changing nature of war/trends in violent conflict ..................................................................... 29 
Networks, bargaining, and the political marketplace ...................................................................... 30 
Hybrid governance and authority ..................................................................................................... 31 
References ................................................................................................................................ 33 
 
  
 1 
 
Practice Without Evidence: interrogating conflict resolution 
 approaches and assumptions 
 
Tatiana Carayannis,1 Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Nathaniel Olin, 
Anouk Rigterink, Mareike Schomerus 
 
Introduction  
What is the evidence that existing approaches to the resolution of violent conflict have 
achieved their intended effects to improve the lives of conflict-affected populations? Violent 
conflict is one of the greatest challenges to development. Two decades of concentrated 
interventions to mediate, end, or transform violent conflict have generated heated debates and 
produced a burgeoning field of new scholarship as well as new tools on conflict resolution. 
Yet, communities worldwide continue to experience conflict every day. It is often unclear 
whether they experience attempts to resolve violent conflict as successful, or as improving 
their lives. This paper seeks to highlight the experiences of people at the receiving end of 
practices of conflict resolution, especially international activities. We refer to them as end-
users, suggesting that those living in conflict situations should be the primary end-users of 
the ‘product’ of conflict resolution.  
The paper is premised on the idea that the actual experiences, practices and strategies  of 
conflict-affected populations must be reflected in any investigation or policy process that 
ultimately may impact on their lives. Thus, we privilege an end-user, or people-centred, 
approach. We also know that many such end-users live under hybrid governance systems 
which may exist outside of, overlap, or subvert formal state structures; thus, our approach is 
not a state-based one. Finally, we believe that conflict response frameworks have failed to 
keep up with the empirical realities of conflict-affected countries. Therefore, the paper has a 
normative agenda that aims to improve responses aimed at bettering the lives of people living 
in conflict. 
This paper provides a synthesis of current evidence in peer-reviewed and, to a lesser extent, 
grey literature on the impact of conflict resolution frameworks on end-users since 1990. It 
investigates to what extent existing literature on conflict uses empirical data that addresses 
the experiences and perspectives of the end-user, and assesses the quality of that data. It seeks 
to understand which interventions in various contexts have improved the lives of conflict-
affected populations. Focusing on end-users necessarily omits other literatures on the causes 
and consequences of conflict, but a limited focus allows for sharper conclusions about the 
conflict resolution frameworks employed by domestic and international peacebuilders. 
No review of existing evidence can be truly global without years of work and a large team of 
multilingual researchers, since much of the literature outside of western (and Anglophone) 
social science remains outside electronic database collections, is locally published and/or 
distributed, and is largely not peer-reviewed. However, the value of assessing the evidence 
base in academic, peer-reviewed literature in the global North lies in its dominance and 
disproportionate influence on policy narratives and policymakers, as evidenced by the way 
                                                 
1
 The authors would like to thank Mary Kaldor and David Keen for their substantive inputs; Silvio Cordova, 
Ambreen Malik, Catriona O’Dowd, Danielle Stein, and Craig Valters from the London School of Economics, 
and Jelena Bjelica and Damir Kapidz̆ić from the South East Europe Research Network, for their research 
assistance. 
 2 
 
in which the theory and practice of conflict resolution has evolved over the last two 
decades. 
Evolving approaches to ‘conflict resolution’ 
What do we mean by conflict resolution? The term has gained currency in the last 20 years, 
as the end of the Cold War and the eruption of civil wars in eastern and southern Europe and 
increased attention to such conflicts in Africa stimulated scholars and analysts to explain the 
changing nature of war and how to end it.  
Increasingly, conflicts which are initiated within national borders are fought across entire 
regions, and involve multiple state and non-state actors. Civilians are caught up in these 
conflicts in manifold ways: as explicit and primary targets of violence, but also as warring 
parties. Partly as a reaction to this trend, and partly reflecting an evolution in the international 
architecture designed to deal with violent conflict, efforts to articulate multilateral 
frameworks and a set of dominant practices to resolve these conflicts have increased over the 
last two decades.2 Since the peace process in Northern Ireland, the end of apartheid in South 
Africa, and in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, a new and more diverse generation of 
conflict management tools and institutions has emerged. These include multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations with complex peacebuilding and peace enforcement mandates, the 
expansion of a diverse mediation community of practice, the establishment of new bodies 
such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission, and a proliferation of multilateral, state, and non-governmental conflict 
management actors operating in complex security environments.  
A comparable growth in conflict resolution studies within international relations and other 
social science disciplines accompanied this expansion in the number and types of conflict 
resolution actors.3 The conflict resolution field on both sides of the Atlantic is underpinned 
by a neoliberal consensus. Theory and practice over the last two decades have reinforced one 
another, and increasingly emphasised a rights-based, and in some cases avowedly apolitical 
interventionist approach to conflict prevention, civilian protection, and justice delivery.4  
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 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, initially greeted with enthusiasm for 
greater UN action worldwide, lost its allure following the UN’s ineffectiveness in Somalia in 1993, its inaction 
in Rwanda in 1994, and its sidelining by the overwhelming NATO interventions in the Balkans beginning in 
1995. Success in Mozambique was overshadowed by the more visible failures. 
3
 Conflict resolution studies first emerged as an inter-disciplinary field in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. In the US, the field owes its intellectual roots to the scholarship of Kenneth E. Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, 
and Harold Laswell, who founded the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 and two years later, the Center for 
Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan. In Europe, the field was supported by 
governments and emphasized policy-relevant research. The International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 
founded in Oslo in 1959 and initially headed by sociologist Johan Galtung, was the first such European centre. 
Galtung then launched the Journal of Peace Research in 1964 (Bercovitch et al. 2009; Dennis et al. 2009). The 
early years of the field were devoted to theorising about war and its causes; post-Cold War approaches to 
managing conflict have re-energised the promise of the liberal peace and (despite the failures of the UN in the 
mid-1990s) the belief that ‘multilateralism matters.’ 
4
 The norm of intervention in the name of civilian populations was foreshadowed in then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan’s Ditchley Park lecture on 26 June 1998 in which he boldly announced that ‘our job is to intervene’ 
(Annan 1999, 3-16). This was followed by a controversial address to the UN General Assembly in September 
1999 in which he called for a right to humanitarian intervention ‘to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ 
(Annan 1999, 37-55). In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty named this 
emerging consensus the ‘responsibility to protect’. The UN General Assembly endorsed it and the following 
year, the new African Union charter relaxed the OAU’s 30-year position on the sanctity of state sovereignty 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001).  
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That said, what various actors mean by ‘conflict resolution’ is unclear. The broader academic 
literature falls into two camps: one that approaches conflict resolution in terms of negative 
peace, and the other, that foregrounds the transformative processes towards peacebuilding. 
Often, particularly in policy practice, conflict resolution tends to be used synonymously with 
attempts to resolve a conflict through a negotiated agreement. ‘Conflict resolution’ is also 
used to refer to tools that have yet to show whether they can ‘resolve’ conflict (this is 
particularly true for new justice measures). We use the term ‘conflict resolution’ in its 
broadest sense, meaning the various elements that are brought together when attempting to 
end, mitigate, or often simply contain violent conflict. This paper interrogates the 
assumptions on which dominant conflict resolution approaches are based, assesses the 
evidence base for these assumptions, and identifies gaps that must be addressed by scholars 
and practitioners to better understand what works and what does not. 
Paper overview 
Two overarching themes emerge from the literature surveyed here. The first is the 
overwhelming yet under-addressed need to manage conflict complexity, including trans-
national dynamics and the proliferation of non-state actors in conflict. The second theme is 
the omnipresence of normative concepts of conflict resolution, which describe how conflict 
resolution ought to work based on the liberal principles underpinning it, rather than the actual 
impact it has. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the methods used to collect 
the evidence. It also summarises key findings about how conflict is conceptualised in the 
literature and overall thematic trends. The second section analyses the surveyed literature and 
explores the strengths and shortcomings of a cross-section of evidence on a variety of themes. 
This approach allows us to identify both what we know and gaps in the evidence that point to 
fruitful areas for further research. A final section draws on key findings from our literature 
surveys to propose a future research agenda that will help strengthen the evidence base on 
which we form our understanding of conflict and its resolution. 
Database-driven searches 
The database-driven method of collecting and reviewing evidence consisted of the following 
steps. A list of databases was compiled indexing peer-reviewed academic literature, subject-
specific databases, web-based open access resources, and others. A string of keywords was 
entered into various databases, yielding a number of hits. The abstracts of these hits were 
read, and works meeting the inclusion criterion were selected: did the work include any local 
level empirical data or information of any kind on individuals and households in conflict-
affected situations, their role in the conflict resolution process or the effect conflict resolution 
has on their lives? The selected works were read, graded and annotated following the Justice 
and Security Research Programme (JSRP) grading method.5 This resulted in an annotated 
bibliography, which is the basis for our critical engagement with the literature presented in 
the subsequent sections of this evidence paper.  
For the purpose of this evidence paper, the following search string was used:  
“peace process” OR peacemaking OR peace-making OR mediation OR “conflict 
prevention” OR “conflict resolution” OR “conflict management” OR peacekeeping 
OR peacebuilding OR peace-building OR “conflict transformation” OR stabilization 
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OR stabilisation OR reconstruction OR post-conflict OR “peace agreement” OR 
cease-fire OR ceasefire OR “peace negotiations” OR “peace settlement” OR “peace 
deal”  
AND 
war OR “civil war” OR violence OR insurgency OR rebellion OR conflict OR non-
state OR informal OR trans-boundary OR transboundary OR trans-national OR 
transnational OR intra-state OR intrastate 
The first string of synonyms was designed to capture various contemporary approaches to 
violent conflict resolution. The second string represents conflict-affected situations, or the 
context in which these approaches are implemented. In order to avoid finding 
overwhelmingly state-centric literature, terms such as ‘non-state’, transnational, and informal 
were included.  
The search was restricted to works published during or after 1990; as stated in the 
introduction, the end of the Cold War represented a turning point in scholarly thinking and 
policy making on conflict resolution. The search was also restricted to works on Afghanistan, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (previously Zaire), 
Guatemala, Ireland, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda. These countries were chosen because they have known considerable conflicts in 
recent years, as well as extensive international and local efforts to resolve them. Ireland, 
Guatemala, and Mozambique were included because conflict resolution efforts in these 
countries are generally seen as ‘successes’ in order not limit the sample to cases of failed 
peace processes or continued violence. Colombia was included because of the persistent 
ongoing violence and emerging drug trafficking networks, both within Latin America and 
across regions, as one example of non-state actors playing an increasingly prominent role in 
contemporary conflicts.  
The resulting hits from the literature searches were filtered by the following inclusion 
criterion: did the work include any local-level empirical data or information of any kind on 
individuals and households in conflict-affected situations, their role in the conflict resolution 
process or the effect conflict resolution has on their lives? If the number of hits returned for a 
given database was large (over 1,000), we sorted the results by relevance and scanned the 
first 500 at minimum, and only continued to scan a larger number if the researcher judged 
that the results further down the list were still relevant to the research question.  
The results from the exercise described above are displayed in Table 1. Only a small 
percentage (3.1%) of the literature meets the inclusion criterion and includes local-level 
empirical information. In our experience, this both reflects a lack of empirical data in general 
and a lack of attention to end-users in particular (many works include country-level data 
only). 237 hits were marked as meeting all the criteria, amounting to 185 unique works, of 
which 174 could be accessed and graded. There was relatively little overlap between the 
results from the various databases. 
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Table 1: Results of database-driven literature search by database 
Database Database type 
No. hits after using 
main search string 
and cut-off date 
No. hits 
after adding 
country 
names 
No. hits 
scanned 
No. hits meeting the 
inclusion criterion 
Scopus General, peer-reviewed academic 500,000 543 543 63 
ISS General, peer-reviewed academic 17,691 1,635 1,635 60 
IBSS/PAIS/ProQuest General, peer-reviewed, academic 9,751 1,060 1,060 56 
CIAO Subject-specific, non-academic and 
academic 
3,350 51 51 9 
EBSCO Subject-specific, peer-reviewed 
academic 
7,639 2,132 2,132 8 
BBC Monitoring 
service on Nexis General, journalistic 
Too many results to 
display number 
3,500 500 9 
Google Scholar General, academic  Unable to input full search string 
Scirus General, peer-reviewed and non-
peer-reviewed academic 
20,000 4,658 500 2 
Refseek General, IGO, NGO and academic Unable to input full search string 
OAISTER General, institutional repositories  7,484 137 137 1 
Worldcat General, books No abstracts present; few results 
DART Europe General, doctoral theses 933 74 74 25 
DATAD General, doctoral theses concerning 
Africa No relevant results 
Technorati General, blogs No relevant results 
Blogines General, blogs No relevant results 
Nexis General, journalistic Too many results to display number 1,000 1 
Amazon General, books. Difficulties inputting full search string 3 
TOTAL 566,848 13,790 7,632 237 
Number of unique hits 185 
Number of works graded 174 
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Table 2 categorises the works found by country and theme. Most papers graded focus 
on single case studies (160) rather than on multiple countries (14). The majority of 
works in some way concern governance and the role and legitimacy of various actors 
in post-conflict situations. Papers are relatively evenly spread between general ideas 
of (state) governance, local and/or hybrid governance and grassroots participation, the 
role of international actors, women’s participation, and the reintegration of conflict 
actors. Civil society was the subject of 10 papers, while seven papers explored 
criminality and war economies. Conceptualisations of conflict and justice are 
explored in 23 and 15 papers respectively. The category ‘other’ includes papers on 
individual trauma from conflict and coping mechanisms, and three articles about 
sports as a conflict resolution tool. We were surprised not to find any papers 
addressing issues of sexual violence, especially in the DRC. 
 
Table 2: Results of database-driven search by country and theme 
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Northern 
Ireland 8 8 5 3  9 2  3 2 2 2 5 32 
Kosovo and 
B-H 1 5 3  2 12 4  1 1 6 3 4 25 
Sierra Leone  5  2 3 12 1  1 6 4 3 3 23 
Sudan 2 2 1 1  6 2  1 2 1 3 4 17 
Multiple 3 4 2 2  6 3   2 1  1 14 
DRC 1 4 1 2 1 4 2  1  1  1 10 
Liberia 1 2  1 1 7  1 2 2 2   10 
Afghanistan 2 1  1  3 3     1  7 
Uganda 1 3 2 1  3 1   1 1   7 
Guatemala 1 2  2  1   1   2  6 
Colombia  1  1  3  1   2  1 5 
Mozambique 2 1  1  0       1 4 
Somalia  0    1    1  1 1 3 
Rwanda  1 1   0       1 2 
Cyprus  1 1   0        1 
Georgia  1 1   0        1 
No details 1 3 3   1 1      2 7 
TOTAL 23 44 20 17 7 68 19 2 10 17 20 15 24 174 
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Generally, themes cut across the country cases, but a few themes are more prominent 
in some country cases than in others. For example, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
were the only cases with papers on refugee return, the papers on Afghanistan mainly 
addressed the success and failure of international actors in the war, and the papers on 
Liberia and Sierra Leone were disproportionately focused on the participation of 
women.  
The majority of works surveyed used an interview-based method (82), followed at a 
distance by observation-based methods (37), other methods (27), studies gathering 
new quantitative data (20) and those using existing quantitative datasets (11).6 Overall, 
the last two categories received significantly higher grades. Papers that were found to 
contain 50% or more empirical data received significantly higher scores than papers 
found to contain between 10% and 50% empirical data. 
A final comment on the general quality of the works graded. The vast majority of 
works devote little or no time to discussing the methodology employed, which makes 
determining the method of data collection difficult. Many authors repeatedly cite 
interviews with officials, civil society, or the general population, and provide 
approximate time of interview, but do not provide names, locations, position, and so 
forth. Most authors failed to consider or address biases in their research or their 
respondents, or note possible limitations of their data. The quantitative research 
reviewed generally devotes more time to the methods used, which may explain why 
these papers received higher scores. Failure to discuss methodology does not 
necessarily imply that the methods employed were flawed, or that the work does not 
generate or employ evidence. However, it does present a challenge for the reader to 
assess the quality of the work and evidence base. We consider a section on 
methodology an opportunity for authors to convince the reader that the research 
carried out was indeed rigorous. 
Journal searches: search terms and criteria 
Given the limitations of the database-driven search process, we decided to conduct a 
second systematic search to supplement our evidence yield and triangulate our 
methods. We considered this necessary in order to have greater confidence in our 
findings and be able to claim with greater certainty the lack of local-level empirical 
data on certain topics. We argue that a systematic search of the top journals in the 
field of conflict resolution will yield a more accurate overview of the key debates in 
the field than a database-driven search alone.  
We employed the following method for the journal search. Each member of the 
conflict research team was asked to provide the names of what they considered as 
the five top peer-reviewed journals in the field of conflict resolution. The inter-
disciplinary nature of the team (anthropology, economics, political 
science/international relations) ensured a broad range of suggestions. We chose 
the 15 most recommended journals, which we compared against the 2009 
Thompson-Reuters citation ranking system. The resulting list of journals is 
displayed in Table 3.  
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The research team went through every article in these journals published in the 
last 10 years. This is a shorter time span than the database-driven searches, first, 
because experience taught us that most relevant literature was published in later 
years (only 10 works from our database searches were from the period 1990 to 
2000 inclusive); and second, because of limited time and resources. Articles from 
this period were selected if they (a) were relevant to our research question 
(concerned approaches to violent conflict resolution); (b) concerned one of our 
case study countries; (c) contained local level empirical data. Note that this 
method mimics the database-driven method, with human judgment replacing the 
computer-generated keyword searches.  
Table 3: Results of journal search, by journal 
Journal No. works matching all 
criteria 
Journal of Peace Research 15 
Small Wars and Insurgencies Unavailable through LSE 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 
International Peacekeeping 18 
Survival 10 
Disasters 4 
Foreign Affairs 7 
Conflict, Security and Development 12 
Accord 9 
Peace, Conflict and Development 3 
Global Change, Peace and Security 3 
Civil Wars 23 
International Organization 3 
Third World Quarterly 16 
Global Governance 1 
TOTAL 122 
Limitations 
The systematic database searches and the grading process were subject to several 
limitations: 
1. Missed literature. Much of the literature considered significant by specialists of 
the cases on which we focused was not captured by these searches. This suggests that 
systematic database-driven searches alone are insufficient to provide an unbiased 
overview of the literature, and could be misleading if they are not overseen by 
specialists in the field. There may be a variety of explanations for this: a) this 
literature is not indexed by the various databases, or not indexed under the keywords 
we searched on; b) this literature did not include local-level data; c) this literature was 
somehow found, but was not recognised as relevant (and therefore ranked ‘on top of 
the list’ of results) by the search engines. On balance, the searches produced some 
known and some lesser known literature, a good safeguard against recycling the 
‘usual suspects’. While thus removing the personal bias of the research team, it 
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introduced another one, as we were more likely to include works that were better 
indexed by search engines.  
2. Lack of ‘grey’ literature and books. Although we took care to select search 
engines that indexed literature from international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), governments, and other types of 
‘grey’ literature, very few works of this type were found through our literature 
searches. This is partly due to the limitations of search engines specialising in this 
type of literature, which could not accommodate the full search string. Books were 
similarly under-represented in our search engines, and very few books made it into 
our final literature selection.  
3. Biases in inputting search terms. Although the search terms were well-defined, 
researchers experienced difficulty inputting the search string into different search 
engines in exactly the same way. Some search engines give the option of searching 
for keywords only in the title and abstract while others offer no such possibility; in 
some, one cannot input more than two search strings; some offer the possibility to sort 
by relevance while others do not. These differences required case-by-case decisions 
on precisely how to input search terms. It is therefore possible that replication would 
generate a different list of literature.  
4. Difficulty in assessing the quality of evidence. As noted above, many works did 
not discuss their methodology. However, many of these papers do not purport to be 
systematic in approach, but are based on a series of informal discussions and 
conversations, rather than a more formal pre-determined approach. This is especially 
the case with the grey literature we surveyed (for example, International Crisis Group 
reports), but for some peer-reviewed literature as well. While this approach is not 
systematic, it may, as a result, have access to valuable primary information. By the 
grading system, these papers would receive poor marks, because it is impossible to 
determine to what extent this information gives an unbiased image of reality. 
5. Grading variations. There were considerable and statistically-significant 
differences in the grades that individual researchers assigned. However, since papers 
were allocated to graders by country rather than randomly, the source of this variation 
cannot be determined. Literature on certain countries may be structured in such a way 
as to score higher in our grading process than the literature on other countries. There 
were considerable differences as to what papers received a high grade for quality of 
analysis and the answers that researchers gave to the ‘control’ question ‘Does the 
paper contain insightful analysis/theory?’ (correlation 0.43). This difference was less 
pronounced in the case of the data quality score and the answer to the question ‘Does 
the paper contain new data/information?’ (correlation 0.58). This indicates that the 
formal scoring and the researcher’s individual assessment of the quality of the data 
and information were considerably different. 
Evidence 
Conceptualisations of conflict  
It would be reasonable to expect that literature addressing ‘conflict resolution’ would 
begin with analysis of the conflict to be resolved. However, the literature mapping 
process described above produced very few papers that directly address how 
researchers conceived of the conflict and few that analyse the drivers of violence in 
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those situations. This is not surprising, as we did not explicitly search for papers on 
conflict drivers. That said, how particular conflicts are conceptualised is significant, 
as this shapes the responses necessary to resolve them. The starting point of any 
resolution attempt also says something about the assumption on where the causes of 
the conflict lie. Most papers take the conflict under discussion as a given; if the 
conflict is given a particular characterisation, there is overall little evidence provided 
to support such a premise. Authors tend to quickly move on to the discussion of a 
particular aspect of the conflict resolution. Papers we reviewed vary in how each 
conceives of the conflict case under consideration - conflict cases are variously 
characterised as civil war, civil war with regional dimensions, inter-ethnic conflict, 
identity conflict, intra-state conflict, border conflict, war on terror, ‘merged crises’, or 
youth violence. Only three of the papers reflected on the way in which end-users 
conceived of a particular conflict. One looked at youth perceptions, one at belligerents 
- arguing that how warring parties view the conflict affects how they bargain - and 
one presented a participatory method of assessing conflict impact.7  
Overwhelmingly, the literature we surveyed focuses on the ‘latter’ stages of conflict - 
peace processes, peacebuilding, and reconstruction efforts. This orientation highlights 
one of the key gaps in the conflict resolution literature: a lack of attention to the 
underlying causes of conflict and how trajectories of conflict change. The 
overwhelming focus on the resolution of conflicts typically assumes a linear 
progression from conflict to peace process to reconstruction/peacebuilding, with 
relapses into conflict framed as backsliding, or failure of these peace processes. This 
analytical approach fails to situate conflict resolution efforts and end-user impact in 
the larger context of the conflict itself.  The nature of the conflict and the drivers of 
violence, which are often active throughout ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction, are 
overlooked in discussions about processes and interventions aimed at resolving the 
conflict. Ultimately this lack of attention to the conceptualisation of conflict and the 
drivers of violence results in a body of literature that unhelpfully isolates the 
dynamics of conflict resolution from the context of the conflict itself. 
Many contemporary conflicts defy traditional distinctions between ‘intrastate’ and 
‘interstate’ armed conflicts. While the battlefield may be local, violence transcends 
territorial boundaries. These conflicts are at the same time inter-personal, local, 
national, regional, and international in nature, and link both state and non-state actors, 
sometimes with a global reach.8  There is rarely a neat dividing line between the 
external and internal dimensions of conflict—and yet most scholars continue to 
separate ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forces, actors and processes when addressing 
conflict resolution issues. While researchers acknowledge the presence of 
transnational forces, most regional9 dynamics are considered as merely ‘spillover’ 
effects from an internal conflict. 10  Those papers that have taken on the task of 
conceptualising modern conflict as being characterised by a multiplicity of actors and 
agendas that combine and re-align in intricate ways along a conflict-to- peace 
                                                 
7
 Harland and McCready 2010; Blaydes and De Maio 2010; Bornstein 2010. 
8
 Carayannis, ‘The Complex Wars of the Congo’ (2003); see also Kalyvas (2006). 
9
 The ‘region’ itself is ambiguously defined. 
10
 Marchal (2006) explores the interrelationship between the conflicts in Chad and Darfur, arguing that 
this dynamic should be the central focus of peace efforts. However, the paper is not grounded on local-
level data or primary sources. On the other side, Van Leeuwen (2010) provides a well-sourced account 
of how identifying conflict in the Great Lakes as ‘regional’ in nature has either failed to translate into 
actual policy changes on the ground, or resulted in policy divorced from on the ground realities. 
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continuum,  have yet to overcome the challenges posed by the ambiguity and 
elusiveness of the dynamics they attempt to nail down. Therefore, there is a great 
scope for research providing a better understanding of the transnationalisation of 
contemporary armed conflicts. Insofar as some of the papers in our literature search 
attempt to expand our understanding of modern conflicts11  including its transnational 
character, most of these fail to provide empirical evidence on which to base their 
recommendations for conflict resolution. 12  This is partly a consequence of the 
opaqueness which surrounds the agency of transnational actors and the challenges this 
creates to data collection and its verification.   
Several of the papers investigate the role of some of the transnational actors involved 
in contemporary conflicts and conflict resolution, such as diasporas and transnational 
organised criminal syndicates for example. The three papers on diasporas emphasise 
the constructive role of these actors in peacebuilding, although the evidence in all 
three is either weak or missing.13 Moreover, the papers approach diasporas as stand-
alone actors insofar as scant attention is given to how they relate to other key actors 
driving the conflict resolution process, this interaction being the key to the outcome of 
the process itself. Broader experience of contemporary conflicts demonstrates that 
diasporas play a much more ambiguous role, not least as the key war protagonists and 
spoilers of peace building efforts, often closely linked to the warring parties and the 
respective political factions. A similar cautionary observation holds true on how the 
reviewed literature approaches organised crime as another prominent transnational 
actor. The case in point is the discussion of organised crime in Schroeder and 
Friesendorf (2009) who interrogate organised crime as a unitary actor operating in the 
zones of conflict, primarily motivated by the pursuit of commercial goals in the 
institutionally fluid environment of war-affected countries. The wider literature, 
however, has increasingly put the spotlight on the complex linkages to other actors, 
including most importantly to local governance structures.  
As a result, the analysis that overlooks the multiple links that connect a variety of 
actors engaged in modern warfare, including diasporas and organised crime, fails to 
appreciate how transnational networks  operate as conflict actors in their own right, 
and thus as a force that shapes the transformation of war-affected societies from 
within - often negatively. This suggests an important conceptual and methodological 
lacuna, in that the literature approaches globalisation as a context in which 
contemporary conflicts are situated, rather than as a force internal to the dynamics of 
conflict, which therefore requires a different kind of analysis. This is another 
drawback of the analytical separation of the internal and external in the analysis of 
contemporary armed conflicts that prevails both in the literature we surveyed and the 
broader scholarship in this field and has implications for the policy and practice of 
conflict resolution. 
                                                 
11
 Gleditsch (2004) provides a well-evidenced argument investigating the impact of third (regional) 
parties on belligerents, and concludes that third parties do in fact influence national actors, although the 
manner in which they influence actors depends on the nature of the third party. 
12
 Heathershaw (2008) interrogates the ‘liberal peace’, arguing that this supposedly pragmatic approach 
to peacebuilding is in fact very proscriptive. Although it proposes a comprehensive overview of how 
peacebuilding is conceptualised in order to respond to conflict, it fails to premise any of its 
recommendations on empirical data or primary sources.  
13
 Antwi-Boateng (2010); Arabi (2008); Bermandez (2011). 
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In short, we know that contemporary war is rooted in a combination of intricate local 
histories and contemporary influences, and is waged in complex environments 
consequent to the growing interconnectedness associated with globalisation. The 
scholarly literature has thus far paid insufficient attention to how this complexity is 
structured - how (transnational) conflict networks as actors in their own right that link 
together a disparate assembly of agents, motives and interests emerge and form; how 
they change and adapt throughout armed conflict and after its formal end; and how 
the relations between context and agency play out to define the course of conflict 
resolution. Our understanding of the types of hybrid governance spaces which are 
created by these forces is limited at present. It rests on patchy evidence, particularly 
with respect to an empirically-grounded interrogation of how ordinary people situate 
themselves in these spaces. There are serious gaps in the existing research on what 
types of interventions best address particular complexities - or sociologies - of 
violence. The breadth, depth, and quality of evidence-based research on which 
interventions impact positively, or negatively, on the end-user who is negotiating 
her/his everyday life under hybrid governance arrangements is particularly inadequate. 
For example, the way in which end-user agency may add another dynamic - and one 
that is not necessarily conducive to conflict resolution such as in the case of  poppy 
growing by Afghan villagers - is particularly inadequate. 
Quantifying conflict and/or violence  
One way in which a particular conceptualisation of conflict is expressed is when 
authors attempt to quantify conflict or violence. This section evaluates those papers 
from our systematic literature search that were coded as containing some quantitative 
data. It evaluates how conflict is conceptualised through measurement, the extent to 
which this is congruent with an end-user focused approach to conflict, and the 
reliability of the resulting analyses. From this perspective, event-based and survey-
based approaches appear to be the most promising ways forward. 
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Table 3: Papers coded as quantitative, categorised by method of quantifying 
conflict 
Method of quantifying conflict Papers found in this category # papers 
Cross-country conflict dummy (Eck, 2009; Escriba-Folch, 2010; Harbom & 
Wallensteen, 2010; Johansson, 2010) 
4 
Event-based (Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2004; Jarman, 2004; 
Meernik, 2005; Poole, 2004; Sluka, 2009) 
5 
Survey-based (Gupta & Zimmer, 2008; Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2007; McAloney, McCrystal, 
Percy, & McCartan, 2009) 
3 
Participatory (Bornstein, 2010) 1 
No method of quantifying 
conflict: survey into perceived 
success of peace-building 
(Byrne, Fissuh, Thiessen, Irvin, & Tennent, 
2010; Jones, 2007; Knox, 2010; 
Wehrenfennig, 2009) 
4 
No method of quantifying 
conflict: survey into post-
conflict perceptions  
(Gilligan, Hainsworth, & McGarry, 2011; 
Gilpin & Downie, 2009; Hayes & 
McAllister, 2009; Kolouh-westin, 2004; S. 
McEvoy, 2000; McLernon, 2006; O’Hearn, 
2000; Torsti, 2003) 
8 
No systematic data (Darcy, 2008; Goodhand & Sedra, 2010; 
Haufler, 2010; Maney, 2006; K. McEvoy & 
Shirlow, 2009) 
5 
Other (forensic anthropology) (Roberts, 2011) 1 
TOTAL  31 
 
Table 3 shows quantitative papers by their method of quantifying conflict. It is 
striking that over half the papers do not quantify conflict explicitly. Aside from the 
papers that cite some data related to conflict but do not use it systematically, these 
papers employ surveys into perceptions. Perception surveys give end-users the 
opportunity to voice their experiences and opinions, albeit within the framework of 
what the researcher thinks is a pertinent topic. Although knowing an individual’s 
perceptions (e.g. on peace-building, democracy, or community-building) is 
undeniably useful, very few papers investigate how these perceptions were formed 
and which factors influenced them.14 Thus, many papers using perception surveys are 
descriptive rather than analytical and tend to be silent regarding the policy 
implications of how to change perceptions, or mitigate the impact of certain 
perceptions. This category of papers is further dominated by papers on Northern 
Ireland and on the perceptions of specific groups, overwhelmingly children, youth, 
and adolescents.  
We found one single paper using a participatory method of conflict assessment. This 
method allows end-users to define what conflict constitutes for them individually and 
to assess their own situation in these terms. Not unlike perception surveys, it may be a 
valuable descriptive tool, but its analytical uses are doubtful. It is unclear if and how 
different aspects of ‘conflict’ could be aggregated to a measure of conflict and how 
the result differs from indices attempting to measure concepts such as human 
development. Furthermore, by allowing any variable to constitute part of the measure 
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 Exceptions are Hayes and McAllister (2009); McLernon (2006). 
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for conflict, many variables become endogenous to conflict by design, making it 
difficult to analyse its drivers or consequences (e.g. if unemployment is already part 
of the measure of conflict, it is impossible to determine whether unemployment spurs 
conflict, or whether conflict increases unemployment).  
The final method of quantifying conflict by soliciting direct input from end-users is 
survey-based. These papers conceptualise conflict as an individual’s exposure to, or 
participation in, various conflict events, such as killing, violent threats, or forced 
displacement. They then try to gauge the consequences of this for the individual’s 
later life. Survey data thus enables valuable analysis as well as description, although 
not all studies we considered discuss potential biases (such as the possibility that 
individuals who are likely to perpetrate or experience violence have substantially 
different characteristics than those who are not). The studies reviewed focus on very 
specific groups (i.e. children and ex-combatants), most likely because of the high 
costs involved in running a survey. So, the generalisability of the results is likely to be 
low. It also makes recent initiatives to include a conflict module in major ‘standard’ 
surveys of increased interest.15 
Four papers identified through the searches employ a cross-country dummy for 
conflict. This characterises a country as a whole as ‘in conflict’ if violence 
surrounding a political incompatibility has caused more than 1000 (or 25 for minor 
conflict) battle-related deaths. No direct input from end-users is solicited, and the data 
does not capture patterns of conflict within-country and contains only very limited 
variation over time. This requires analyses using this data to make cross-country 
comparisons. Unfortunately, at the country level, there may be any number of 
country-specific third factors biasing the analysis. None of the papers we identified 
has convincingly solved these problems of endogeneity.  
Finally, we encountered an event-based method of quantifying conflict. Conflict in 
this conceptualisation consists of a series of pre-defined types of events, taking place 
at a specific date and geographic location. These events are often instances of 
violence, although some papers code interactions between specified actors on a scale 
from conflict to cooperation.16 In the cases found, events are coded from media or 
police sources and no direct input is solicited from end-users (although the method 
itself allows reporting directly by end-users, for example through crowd-sourcing). 
Event-based data contains ample variation over time and within-country, making it 
easier to address endogeneity concerns, and two papers do so explicitly. 17  This 
increases the reliability of analyses using event-based data considerably. Despite these 
advantages, according to our searches, the field has not made full use of event-based 
datasets that have been published or expanded recently, such as ACLED and UCDP-
GED.   
Governance 
Conceptualisations of governance 
Contemporary conflict resolution frameworks revolve around the triangulation of 
governance, democracy and market-building as a way to stabilise conflict-affected 
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 Bruck et al. 2010. 
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 Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; Meernik 2005. 
17
 Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; Meernik 2005. 
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societies.  Most of the works on conflict resolution we surveyed do not interrogate 
what seem to be pre-defined notions of key governance and post-conflict 
reconstruction ‘outputs’ - for example, security, 18  political stability, economic 
recovery, and more generally ‘good governance’ and the implied benchmarks for 
achieving these outputs. Everyday concerns and priorities of diverse local populations 
seem to be largely absent from these notions. Similar observations apply to other key 
concepts within post-war reconstruction frameworks, such as civil society and justice 
(which are discussed further in the next sections). In fact, the meaning of such 
concepts is plausibly shaped by the idiosyncrasies of local context. 
Some literature acknowledges this gap between local and international conceptions of 
governance. Brinkenhoff (2011) dismisses the mainstream conflict resolution 
approaches informed by the democratic transition paradigm characteristic, particularly 
of the early years of external intervention in conflict-affected environments and their 
top-down focus on the establishment of state-level rules and regulations. Instead, he 
argues in favour of a framework that ties governance to social contract as a set of 
rules that bind the state and society in a set of relations of mutual obligation, 
accountability, and responsibility. The empirical evidence in this paper is thin, but the 
paper is important in that it usefully locates the governance problem in relations 
between state and society, and identifies legitimacy as one of the key aspects of 
effective governance. From this perspective, restoration of sustained legitimate 
political authority - the emphasis on legitimacy effectively foregrounding the end-
users’ concerns and agency - is the essence of recovering and improving governance 
in conflict-affected environments. 
This aspect is largely sidestepped in the research under review, which approaches 
governance primarily as an issue of what kind of formal institutions are being built 
and the procedural aspects of how they come into place. Much less attention is given 
to deciphering the social and political relations that underpin them and how those are 
reworked as a consequence of conflict. Very rarely is it made explicit that the tools of 
liberal peacemaking are political tools as well, impacting on local power relations 
with direct consequences for the position of end-users. Sossai’s (2005) work on the 
delegitimisation of armed groups in the context of the war on terror is a good example 
of how the space for interventions is closed through legal constraints (defining groups 
as terrorist, thereby dismissing legal protection or negotiations). Thus, a political tool 
(labelling) is used to exclude major actors from a political process. Often the 
literatures seems to misleadingly assume that the tools of conflict resolution - if 
administered in the correct, regulated, and ‘locally-owned’ way - are pure, inclusive, 
linear and self-determined means by legitimate actors for a community to overcome 
past violence. 
Hybrid governance and local dynamics 
A prominent normative argument in discussions about post-conflict governance is that 
local structures need to be taken seriously and that a deeper understanding of them is 
needed.19 States are generally seen as playing an uncertain role in this debate. This is 
                                                 
18
 On security, see JSRP Paper 2 by Robin Luckham and Tom Kirk (2012) 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP2.LuckhamKirk.pdf 
19
 See for example the Baker and Sheye (2009) account of post-conflict justice mechanisms in 
South Sudan, and the Branch and Mampilly (2005) analysis of forms of local governance in 
South Sudan.  
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largely driven by the idea that while decentralising state authority comes with its own 
challenges, a locally-owned hybrid minimal state might be an effective and 
accountable alternative in a post-conflict setting to the long-term statebuilding 
approach championed by many international interventions.20 
The literature reviewed demonstrates a broad consensus around a need for more local 
‘bottom-up’ interventions when addressing conflicts. It assumes that actors in a 
bottom-up process will have legitimacy. For example, Autessere (2009) argues that 
the discursive frames with which international actors understand the DRC lead them 
to over-privilege national and regional peace processes overlooking at their peril local 
conflict dynamics and conflict resolution mechanisms and strategies; Baker and 
Sheye (2009) makes the point that local justice mechanisms should be taken more 
seriously by South Sudan’s international and multilateral partners; Buchanan (2008) 
emphasises the importance of grassroots participatory democracy in the peace process 
in Northern Ireland.  
However, the emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ as a concept and form of intervention is 
normatively charged. Much of the literature reviewed tends to treat a bottom-up 
approach as a way to depart from the national and extra-national politics of the 
conflict by foregrounding local, indigenous, grass roots levels of action and agency. 
The political element that comes with this shift is largely overlooked, along with the 
fact that in a ‘post-conflict’ context, actors may well understand ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches differently, just as they understand ‘community-level’ or ‘local-level 
interventions’ to mean different things. The papers reviewed reflect a tendency in the 
broader academic debates and policy practice rarely to acknowledge that the role of 
the government, national and international NGOs, civil society organisations, and 
international or multilateral organisations can often be contentious and not necessarily 
conducive to conflict resolution. However, few authors have investigated how 
peacekeeping missions, international mediators, or various third parties to conflicts 
can operationalise this local-level engagement. Finally, the literature reviewed 
recognises that as much as the shift in focus towards the local and indigenous is of 
critical importance, multilateral peacekeeping lacks many of the tools necessary to 
engage with local communities or contribute to local-level peace processes.21 Indeed, 
it is unclear what ‘legitimate actors’ can steer the locally-owned hybrid structures. 
There remains a significant void in our understanding of the sources of legitimacy in 
post-war contexts where the statebuilding agenda of external intervention has 
prioritised output-based legitimacy of formal government, driving policy focus 
towards capacity building to improve public service delivery, which a number of 
reviewed papers echo.22 But how a ‘local state’ is legitimised, and why people submit 
to rule which in many post-war societies may be arbitrary, discriminatory and even 
coercive, needs further research. Given the complex nature of most contemporary 
armed conflicts, it has to shift the inquiry beyond official government structures and a 
focus on output legitimacy and probe into different forms and sources of legitimacy 
operating in the hybrid governance framework. Although Brinkerhoff mentions 
different local forms of governance in passing, and McDonough (2008) looks 
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 Baker and Sheye 2009. 
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 Autessere (2009) outlines how UN peace operations inherently privilege national or regional actors 
and processes, not simply out of strategic priorities but due to the fundamental nature and assumptions 
of UN engagement. 
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 Cometto et al. 2010; Burt and Keiru 2011. 
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specifically into rebel governance, the nature of political authority and the manner in 
which power is exercised, and legitimised in the post-conflict context remains ill-
understood. Broad categories developed to capture the phenomenon such as ‘shadow 
state’, ‘hidden powers’, or ‘rebel governance’ need to be unpacked in order to locate 
the sites and sources of real power in post-conflict societies and how it is sustained. 
Although lacking robust empirical evidence, Branch and Mampilly (2005) make a 
critical observation regarding the prospect of local government in pre-independence 
southern Sudan, when they point to the complex links of the members of local 
government, who are in fact former military, to the local population. The 
transformation of wartime actors and structures and their post-war adaptation 
(including evolving relations with the public) is recognised as a critical issue of post-
war governance by Andreas (2004). This is a subject that although increasingly 
gaining in currency, remains insufficiently understood due to both conceptual as well 
as methodological issues. 
Overall, the literature reviewed reveals a gap in knowledge of what dynamics 
transform or reinforce existing power structures, and the extent to which there is 
synergy or contradiction among different forms of de facto authority, as in 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone or Sudan. It often fails to demonstrate or even propose how 
to situate local interventions into the national context, particularly within semi-
authoritarian contexts or international tensions.23 In addition, the literature we have 
reviewed pays insufficient attention to the role of external actors in shifting local 
power relations although this may directly undermine efforts to mitigate and resolve 
conflict. One example of how this dynamic may play out is demonstrated by Branch 
and Mampilly (2005) who show how the SPLA controlled NGO-provided assistance 
in southern Sudan, complicating the post-war political consolidation of the SPLA. 
The most convincing work is produced when empirical research and close attention to 
political realities merge to create an understanding of the roles of different actors in a 
post-conflict setting, including internationals in particular, even in providing 
something as seemingly technical as health care.24 
In sum, the literature reviewed acknowledges the limitations of top-down imposition 
(by international actors) of prescriptive, state-centric notions of governance. It calls 
for more bottom-up processes, local hybrid governance, engagement of civil society 
and grassroots participation, particularly of women, as is discussed further below. 
However, overall this debate is supported by a limited evidence base. While authors 
demonstrate that local dynamics can create obstacles to peace,25 there is no causal 
demonstration that increased attention to local conflict dynamics and actors will 
necessarily address the underlying drivers of these conflicts. Similarly, there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest that local structures are, in the long run, more effective 
for peacebuilding nor the impact that international intervention may have to that end. 
In the prevailing analysis, the end-user’s voice in articulating experience of everyday 
governance is almost non-existent, with a few exceptions that primarily use the end-
user’s voice as a narrator of events. The end-users’ analysis of their own situation and 
of what would need to happen for their predicament to change is avowedly missing in 
the works we have looked into. A lack of attention to politics in unearthing how local 
actors and structures are mobilised and incentivised to mitigate and resolve conflict is 
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25
 Alther 2006; Hoogenboom 2009. 
 18 
 
equally glaring. Often, there is an unspoken assumption that all actors share common 
goals of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Moreover, there is frequently an 
insufficient understanding  of  how particular and seemingly technical ‘fixes’ are not 
neutral and may, in fact,  benefit or disadvantage particular actors. 
Criminality and war economies 
Criminality remains a side-subject in conflict resolution, where it is mainly dealt with 
in terms of outright war criminality, for example as crimes against humanity, or 
criminality as a by-product of war, such as looting, theft, and various forms of 
smuggling. Among a handful of papers on the subject that we identified through the 
systematic literature searches, Andreas (2004) shows how criminality, rather than 
being a by-product of war, is an integral and instrumental aspect of war activity and 
its transnationalisation. However, the part of the argument he makes that allows for a 
deeper analysis of the implications for conflict resolution and reconstruction 
processes is underdeveloped. The broader literature on the subject overall provides 
little empirical knowledge of why ordinary people engage in various forms of 
criminality associated with war conduct, and what implications this has not only for 
the strategies of economic recovery, but also for intra- and inter-communal relations 
and societal reintegration.  
Escriba-Folch (2010) argues that economic sanctions, particularly multilateral ones, 
are related to shorter conflicts, implicitly arguing that conflicts are driven primarily by 
economic factors. This naturally overlooks the possibility that economic sanctions, 
particularly multilateral ones, are more often applied in cases where they are likely to 
succeed. Preti (2002) investigates violence in Guatemala through structural violence, 
and the political economy of war, but fails to link the analytical framework to the case 
study or to provide primary evidence. McDonough (2008) draws on both ‘greed’ and 
‘grievance’ by arguing that the ‘root causes’ of conflicts in Liberia, Uganda, and 
Rwanda are the distribution of political power, the distribution of economic resources, 
and the mobilisation of identity. Unfortunately, the evidence for this claim is lacking 
and the argument’s reasoning is at times circular and selective. 
None of the papers look specifically into conflict finance, an area where the 
opportunities, structures, and dynamics associated with globalisation are crucially 
important in how violent conflicts are initiated and sustained. The existing evidence 
suggests that there are significant cross-country variations depending on the profile of 
the economy (resource-rich versus resource-poor being the crudest of distinctions), 
although dedicated comparative works on the subject are rare. How a particular 
economic profile (which reflects the particular mode of insertion into the world 
markets) affects the form and the dynamics of informalisation (and criminalisation) 
during war and in its aftermath cannot be well understood without unpacking the 
mechanisms of criminal war economies, an aspect that has not been explicitly 
addressed in the growing scholarship on war economies. The urgency to address this 
shortcoming stems also from emerging threats such as new, transnational drug 
trafficking networks that threaten to undermine peace processes in fragile post-
conflict environments. Research on innovations in global resource governance such as 
the Kimberley process, 26  which addresses conflict finance, does not consider its 
impact on peacebuilding outcomes, nor does it examine how these international 
regimes affect the end-user who, in many cases, is both the victim of the criminal war 
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economy and its active protagonist. Schroeder and Friesendorf’s (2009) analysis of 
international anti-crime programmes illustrates the deficiencies of using legislative 
processes to address criminality in conflict-affected environments. Yet, it is a 
widespread practice, which for complex and complicated reasons is often tolerated by 
broad sections of society. The knowledge gap about this aspect of conflict resolution 
remains particularly wide.  
Actors 
Role and legitimacy of international actors 
A common theme across papers evaluating international interventions is the failure of 
international actors to appreciate, consider, or conform to the local dynamics in which 
conflicts and peace processes are situated.27 This includes divergent or incompatible 
understandings of political systems, incompatible sociologies between mediators and 
parties to peace negotiations, or simply a failure on the part of the international 
community to understand what motivates actors on the ground. 
While this is a frequent challenge facing national and international peacebuilders, it is 
by no means mundane. Communication barriers between multilateral peacekeeping 
missions and the civilians they are tasked to protect can pose a significant challenge 
in terms of responding to impending violence.28  Conflicting socio-cultural norms 
between international actors and local society can impact peacekeeping outcomes.29 
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, often both the 
keystone and the major stumbling block of a peace process, are linked to a number of 
quite complex and unique dynamics, including economic, political, and social systems 
in the country.30 Western conceptions of the state itself are sometimes incompatible 
with the more decentralised, minimalist state arising in a ‘post-conflict’ scenario, 
which may in fact be legitimate and accountable in the short term.31 This is related to 
arguments for prioritising local interventions, but also highlights a perceived 
disconnect between international actors and the political and social realities with 
which they engage. Processes of social reconstruction often take place outside the 
boundaries of formal institutions and agreements, for example the spirit possession 
and ritual cleansing rituals in northern Uganda.32 However, papers in our literature 
searches that stress the need for increased international engagement rarely 
acknowledge that the role of international actors is contentious. This is particularly 
true if international actors wish to bypass state institutions by engaging directly at the 
local, ‘bottom-up’ level. 
That international actors must take into account diverging social, political, and 
economic structures is at face value quite obvious, and the literature repeatedly 
identifies this as a fundamental challenge in specific cases. However, while the 
literature usually tries to provide a mapping of the crucial local dynamics that 
international actors fail to understand, or to give recommendations for specific cases, 
few papers go further to address the challenge of working with local dynamics as a 
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systemic issue for international actors. While peacebuilders often advocate ‘national 
ownership’ and context-sensitive interventions, the scholarship on how to approach 
this goal is limited, as is evidence for its effects. The ‘liberal peace’ toolkit has been 
tested and refined as a technical exercise, but if these efforts are not fundamentally 
shaped by and built upon the local social, political, and economic understandings in 
which conflict takes place, we are forced to ask if these efforts will positively impact 
upon conflict-affected populations in the long term. 
Role and legitimacy of civil society 
Engaging civil society is presented as a way to ensure a ‘bottom-up’ process of 
conflict resolution by articulating end-users’ voices in order to hold the state to 
account for its actions and to prevent abuses of power. However, the literature 
reviewed does not question the many implicit assumptions of this strategy: that civil 
society organisations do, in fact, represent the interests of all conflict-affected 
communities rather than particular constituencies within them; or that it is impervious 
to the politics that drive other national actors; or that including civil society 
organisations in peace processes is beneficial for both the peace process and its 
outcome. The papers that do base their results on concrete evidence raise serious 
cause for concern, as they highlight the political context within which civil society 
organisations operate and the potential that their inclusion will actually damage the 
peace process.33  
The failure to consider political context extends beyond the peace process itself. Good 
governance and the promotion of civil society have gone hand in hand within the 
conflict resolution framework, since voice is thought to be critical for restoring the 
trust that underpins governance, and that civil society can aggregate and articulate 
these voices. Much criticism has been levied on the alleged weakness of civil society 
in terms of capacity, disconnect with indigenous forms, and closeness to donors. The 
papers examined reflect the general trend in the field in two principal aspects - that 
they view civil society principally through the work of NGOs, and that their primary 
interest is in the civil society itself rather than the outcomes of its activity.34  
The specific political and sociological context within which civil society operates in 
the aftermath of war can itself lead to a lack of civil society engagement.35 Moreover, 
the space emerging may not necessarily be either plural or emancipatory.36 Overall, 
the literature reviewed lacks robust evidence on how civil society is configured in 
specific post-conflict contexts, taking into account political, socio-economic, and 
security characteristics, the dynamics of multiple transitions that conflict-affected 
countries are subject to, and the agency of local and transnational actors. 
In the post-war context where state and society remain deeply entwined through 
various hybrid governance forms, discerning the interests and perceptions of civil 
society actors is a complex research task. Consequently, the role and the potential of 
civil society in fostering citizens’ participation in post-war governance remains an 
area where empirical evidence, grounded in the end-user perspective and experience, 
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is scant, including on the forms of activity conducive to improving relations among 
civilian communities.37  
Grassroots participation 
The literature reviewed occasionally makes a proposition that grassroots participatory 
democracy is a possible corrective to the limitations of top-down conflict resolution 
approaches. However, the findings on how this impacts peacebuilding outcomes are 
inconclusive, and the reviewed literature captures this ambiguity. Much work focuses 
on local ‘ownership’ of the conflict resolution process, a slippery and ill-defined term 
used by peacebuilding researchers and practitioners that has recently come under 
scrutiny.38  International interventions often assume a shared understanding of the 
aims of the post-war reconstruction process between international actors and the local 
population. However, there is surprisingly little evidence demonstrating how end-
users perceive the goal of post-war reconstruction, the benchmarks of success, or the 
roles of various actors, including their own.39 Ball (2009) argues that peacebuilding is 
a personal ideal, rather than a broader community- or even state-driven process.40 
Some authors view participation and inclusion as a silver bullet for conflict 
resolution,41 while others depict inclusion efforts as largely symbolic and irrelevant,42 
but in all cases the empirical evidence on how diverse local populations and 
categories of end users engage in conflict resolution processes, and on what factors 
hinder or facilitate their relations with other actors, is very thin.  
The papers retrieved through the systematic literature search are representative of the 
rather vague understanding of whether and how these forums for community 
participation in post-war reconstruction efforts, promoted by the external actors, 
actually foster peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is a multi-layered process and if, as Ball 
(2009) suggests, it is a personal ideal, then gauging the motives for participation in 
grassroots initiatives is fundamental for the peacebuilding outcomes. For example, the 
assumption that enrolling former adversaries in an employment or occupational 
training scheme will lead to reconciliation underpins much of the reasoning for using 
assistance for socio-economic development to further political goals. However, these 
programs may help to ameliorate economic inequalities without promoting cross-
communities.43  If actors enter these participatory initiatives with ulterior motives, 
mere interaction projects may not be sufficient as a medium for reconciliation.44 In 
sum, much more empirical evidence across the issue areas of conflict resolution and 
in different country contexts, and stages of conflict resolution is needed in order to 
substantiate the claims regarding the grass roots participation as a channel for conflict 
resolution.  
Participation of women 
There seems to be a broad consensus that women’s participation is essential in 
conflict resolution processes, but the underlying assumptions of this consensus are 
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rarely questioned. Conceptualisations of conflict resolution are gendered and often 
reductionist in their approach to women’s role in peace processes. Inclusion is often 
presented as a default feminine operating mode. The benefit of women’s participation 
in peace processes (beyond a normative conviction that female participation ought to 
be supported) tends to be based on female ‘soft skills’, such as trust- and community-
building.45 Values, rather than empirical data, underscore affirmations of what the 
role of women ought to be, rather than what it is. For example, successful 
peacebuilding is argued to depend on the participation of women and girls in peace 
processes, but the argument is based on common sense - noting that women would 
rather live in peace instead of violence.46  
Women’s participation in conflict resolution processes is, in most cases, documented 
hastily and with overly prescriptive overtones, providing little systematic data of 
women’s activities or what women specifically achieved.47 Some argue that women’s 
participation leads to successful post-conflict reconstruction, while excluding women 
contributes to the failure of peacebuilding,48 but no data is presented to prove this 
implied causation, and other context that might be crucial to success and failure is 
ignored. The focus in describing women’s roles tends to rest on the activity of women, 
rather on their effect, thus maintaining an idealistic vision of women’s influence, 
rather than one supported by evidence.  
Strikingly, some of the research that stresses the importance of women’s participation 
in peacebuilding fails to acknowledge the broader instruments in place to facilitate it, 
such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 or 2000. Arguments that a refined 
gender-sensitive approach is needed to resolve new wars analyse the role of women’s 
anti-war groups in Yugoslavia, but do not account for why existing structures fail to 
work, or how context, such as other civil society groups and their agendas, makes 
women’s participation difficult.49 
The debate on whether women ought to be treated as a separate category in conflict 
resolution or whether this reinforces gender stereotypes seems to have hardly moved. 
In most literature, women and girls are treated as a distinct category. However, this 
distinctiveness is used to create an obvious and superficial contrast between inclusive 
mechanisms and broad-brush factors, such as international law. Park’s (2006) paper is 
illustrative: without primary local-level data, her argument that girls need to be treated 
differently in the reconstruction process and in how crimes committed against them 
are treated by the Special Court for Sierra Leone fails to actually provide any 
information as to how court decisions driven by international law do influence how 
girls’ lives proceed.50 
Such gender stereotyping ignores what other authors have identified as major stepping 
stones during post-conflict transitions. The continued emphasis on women’s role in 
the private sphere, rather than as active participants themselves in war activities, 
continues to skew post-conflict interventions to define or redefine women’s roles. 
MacKenzie (2009) provides local-level data that shows that the continued definition 
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of women as war victims, even if they take on the role of a soldier, effectively 
excludes them from DDR programmes. McEvoy (2009) presents a similar argument 
about female paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, underlining that the intractability of 
the conflict is a direct result of this exclusion of women as military actors,51 yet fails 
to provide convincing empirical data for what is undoubtedly a crucial point. Smet 
(2009) investigates how DDR processes ought to be an opportunity for reshaping 
gender roles, but fails to draw on transparent empirical data as to how the reshaping 
of gender roles is perceived in the reality of the local context. Such work promotes the 
assumption that a change in gender roles with women’s empowerment is a necessary 
tool for an improved environment. 
As a research approach, the confinement of women’s participation to the private 
sphere creates a method gap, recreating the very same issues addressed in 
structuration theory that those writing about women’s participation tend to criticise.52 
Ball (2009) is a good example of using only narrative methods when analysing 
women’s roles. While she acknowledges the shortcomings of this method, it serves as 
a reminder that research methods are themselves overly gendered, creating a 
discrepancy in data. The association with the private sphere is often equated with the 
most local community level. This intuitive connection links the most local level to 
women playing a particularly important, somewhat holistic role. This is particularly 
true for situations in which higher levels of administration, such as the state, do not 
exist. Dini (2010) writes about how Somali women have expanded their historical part 
in taking on state roles by delivering social services and maintaining or building peace. 
The reasons for the lack of data on women’s participation may be three-fold, although 
most papers tend to only acknowledge the first two arguments. In the first, women’s 
participation is openly hindered by the powers that be. In the second, women’s 
participation consisted primarily of unseen activity, for example by influencing their 
husbands to become peaceful, thus making their participation under-acknowledged, 
informal, and representative of their socio-cultural association with the private sphere. 
In the third, women hardly participate because they are not interested.53 
Reintegration of conflict actors 
Reintegration of conflict actors is considered a crucial element of conflict resolution. 
Yet, as is the case with ‘bottom-up processes’, the exact meaning of ‘reintegration’ 
remains unclear. Reintegration of child soldiers, forced recruits, officially 
demobilised soldiers, and returnees, as well as rehabilitation of perpetrators, tend to 
be lumped together under this catch-all term. Furthermore, reintegration can mean 
anything from returning to one’s home village (part of demobilisation) to entering 
training programmes to being reinstated as a citizen.54 Reintegration describes both an 
                                                 
51
 Her method is questionable in so far as interviewees were selected by snowballing within 
paramilitary groups. This method might have contributed to what often seems a positively biased 
analysis of loyalists’ agendas. 
52
 Jones (2008) uses structuration theory to explain why girl soldiers in Sierra Leone were largely 
marginalised in the DDR process. While the theoretical approach is convincing, the data collected is 
not primary and thus allows limited first hand understanding of the agency of the girl soldiers in being 
marginalised. 
53
 In her doctoral thesis, Anderson (2007) makes the third point strongly, asserting that despite her 
research focus on women’s participation, it may not be generalisable as most women probably did not 
participate widely in the Sudanese peace process either in the public or private sphere. She draws on a 
relatively small sample for her conclusions, but recognises this limitation in evidence.  
54
 Theidon (2007) mixes two vague concepts further by calling for a merging of DDR with transitional 
 24 
 
informal process of shifting location and reconnecting with family as well as ‘formal’ 
measures of reintegration, often accompanied by some sort of material support.55 
Furthermore, reintegration covers both the official measures as well as the experience 
of ‘being reintegrated’.56 
The primary argument of scholars critiquing current approaches seems to be limited 
to calling for a greater awareness towards specific context, background, socio-
economic conditions, and local institutional capacity. The most convincing evidence 
establishes that internationally-driven demobilisation and reintegration programmes 
tend to not be successful because they fail to take motivations of combatants into 
account. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) deliver a credible and locally collected 
data set to make this claim, while combining quantitative and qualitative methods to 
address the shortcomings of each. 
Dahlman’s work stands out in his engagement with the complex layers of returning as 
a part of conflict resolution, particularly in areas that had experienced ethnic cleansing. 
He outlines how the international community’s support for keeping ethnic groups 
separated as an attempt to establish security prevented refugee returns. Realising this 
effect, support was focused on facilitating a process of reclaiming land, which often 
turned out to be a generator for violence.57 
The separate set of problems facing returnees and those who stayed during the war is 
covered widely, and is particularly pertinent with regard to the question of how power 
structures established in war become the entrenched post-war structures that allow a 
continuation of the same damaging and often elitist hybrid governance structures.58 
Most findings, however, stop short of answering the essential question of whether the 
concept of a return to origin remains the most promising way to rebuild a society, or 
whether a much more flexible approach is more promising. Eastmond (2006) 
challenges the notion that permanent returns provide the best path to stability, arguing 
that unassisted returns of Bosnian refugees from Sweden followed a different and 
more stabilising path.  Bosnians returned home voluntarily while maintaining a life in 
Sweden, the effect being that they feel more in control of their lives. 
As part of a broader trend to focus on specific groups, the reintegration literature 
engages more closely with the needs of the perceived ‘most vulnerable’ - women and 
children. It is a well-established argument that protection of children from armed 
recruitment is difficult for multiple reasons: because of variable levels of adherence to 
international standards; the failure to understand the motivations and roles of child 
soldiers in different contexts; and because measures often fall short of allowing a 
quick reinsertion once they return.59 Often, the major argument seems to be that the 
reality of international law on the ground is different from that which the text of the 
law suggests, hardly a surprising and not a very useful finding, unless it is further 
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established how exactly local interpretations differ and could be used in a way that 
allows for legal instruments to provide protection and be accountable. Evidence tends 
to be limited in terms of the number of interviews conducted with child soldiers. The 
literature search did not bring about any interviews with active child soldiers, and 
only a few with former child soldiers. When interviewing former child soldiers, the 
changing perspective of the interviewee is rarely acknowledged. In Francis’ (2007) 
paper, the conclusions drawn from the interviews conducted seem to be intuitive, 
rather than based on an analysis of the interviews.60 
Women’s reintegration seems to be largely focused on the needs of female 
combatants. 61  Ibrahim (2006) argues convincingly by drawing on a transparent 
interview method that gender stereotypes impede women’s reintegration in Sierra 
Leone, as they tend not to be viewed as having been involved enough to need 
reintegration measures. Roberts (2008) argues that unless gender is mainstreamed 
throughout a reintegration process, it is unlikely to bring economic opportunities for 
women and thus will fail to create the ‘normality’ of life in peacetime. 
Unclear concepts of conflict resolution and justice procedures result in unclear 
explanations as to the causes of conflicts and need for justice. Theidon (2009), for 
example, calls for a renewed emphasis on gendering the building blocks of conflict 
resolution, such as DDR and justice, to pay closer attention to ownership of weapons, 
violence and interpretations of masculinity. DDR initiatives, in her argument, need to 
be about much more than just disarming; they need to address the underlying gender 
stereotypes and provide ‘alternative masculinities’ as role models which can be 
followed in civilian life. 
Justice and reconciliation  
Justice and reconciliation take a prominent place in the discourse of conflict 
resolution and have been the focus of a plethora of donor-funded programmes. The 
systematic literature mapping brought up no material that specifically shows the 
impact of conflict resolution justice procedures on the end-user in the long term. 
Some papers establish broader understandings of how current conceptualisations and 
operational interpretations of justice in a conflict resolution process have impacted 
end-users, but data to make credible and broadly applicable claims is scarce. Existing 
literature tends to focus on specific groups, such as combatants, women, or child 
soldiers, rather than the broader and less compartmentalised population. Some of the 
more specific studies seem to suggest - but the evidence is too sketchy to make this a 
firm claim - that end-users see little connection between criminal trials (whether local, 
national, or international) and improvement in their own situation. 
The need to understand the dynamics of each particular conflict, including the 
dynamics of post-conflict recovery, when discussing the scope and outcomes of 
pursuing justice and reconciliation agendas as part of conflict resolution processes is 
widely stressed. Context is recognised as the greatest hindrance to improvements for 
the individual - for example in the case of work opportunities for women in Sierra 
Leone - as well as for recovering communities more broadly.62 It is striking, however, 
that the need to understand context is not generally drawn from evidence that shows 
                                                 
60
 Francis 2007. 
61
 Ebbinghaus 2007. 
62
 Abdullah et al. 2010. 
 26 
 
clearly the context and constraints of one particular case, but seems to be generated 
more from a general awareness.63 
Two major points about using justice mechanisms as a conflict resolution tool can be 
inferred from the literature mapping: one major theme is that justice is understood as 
an all-encompassing tool; another that justice and reconciliation are essentially the 
same thing. The evidence base for either assumption is startlingly inconclusive. 
Justice as an all-encompassing tool  
In this literature mapping, justice seems to be readily equated with a measure for 
peacebuilding, with some critical voices doubting its viability as a reconstructive tool. 
Evidence that justice does, in fact, build peace in the long run is not presented. It is 
striking that the literature fails to look at either concept in more detail to allow greater 
operational insight.  
The operational weakness of justice as a conflict resolution tool lies in the vagueness 
of both concepts. On a more technical level, it is unclear which crimes ought actually 
to be punished under the ‘justice toolkit’ label, and by whom.64 This is indicative of 
the development that justice has come to describe something much broader and very 
different from dealing with perpetrators and victims in court. In what is a largely 
value-driven debate, justice is imagined as having to be inclusive, participatory, 
holistic, tailored to each individual conflict situation, speak to the expectations of the 
participants, give a truth-telling voice to ordinary people, establish long-term 
peacebuilding structures and be cross-disciplinary.65 These holistic transitional justice 
procedures are expected to link in with seemingly more technical peacebuilding tools, 
such as DDR programmes. 66  An obvious dichotomy emerges between concrete 
measurable processes needed for peacebuilding and the envisioning of these processes 
as long-term, often non-measurable acts of gradual societal change in complex 
conflict situations.  
The most common methodological approach underlines the fuzziness of the concepts 
of conflict crimes and justice, with research questions often focusing on perceptions 
of justice, rather than traceable impact, and an emphasis on pitting local 
understandings of justice against international conventions. The seemingly soft side of 
reconstruction, such as memorialising and truth-telling, is often contrasted with the 
hard rebuilding, including physical reconstruction through reparations.67 
Not surprisingly, studies on perceptions of justice tend to establish that local 
perceptions differ from what is considered mainstream in both international law as 
well as concepts of transitional justice. However, this important point often stops 
short of establishing why it is surprising that local perceptions are different from 
mainstream thought, thinking through the consequences of such findings, and 
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outlining an overall applicability to the broader justice debate. Viaene (2010), for 
example, argues that in Mayan Q’eqchi’ culture, not all victims wanted to see 
perpetrators prosecuted and had quite a different view of justice from that generally 
found in international law, yet the policy implications of this finding, along with the 
finding that other Mayan communities did call for prosecution, are unclear. 
The literature fails to address in detail how crimes other than individual war crimes 
can be addressed through the justice toolkit. The assumption that justice can provide a 
way of dealing with past atrocities is hardly explored, yet the latest debates within the 
literature on transitional justice have started to dispute the concept that these ‘tools’ 
can be readily employed. 
Equating justice and reconciliation 
Research on the long-term peacebuilding effect of criminal trials for local 
communities is unsurprisingly scarce. The question of whether criminal trials 
specifically support reconciliation - or whether indeed this should be the courts’ 
mandate - is barely addressed. Truth-telling remains a buzzword in conflict resolution 
studies and is often seen as the ultimate tool to facilitate true reconciliation. However, 
the problem remains of establishing integrated conflict narratives, rather than 
establishing what might be perceived as biased or partial truths, including the issue of 
whether a facilitator can ever be perceived as unbiased.68 
Most evidence about criminal trials and reconciliation comes from Bosnia, with one 
notable empirical example. Meernik’s (2005) work aims to test the linkage between 
trial and reconciliation. He concludes that events in the criminal court do not have a 
meaningful effect on what he calls ‘societal peace’, i.e. whether different groups can 
live together peacefully. Clark (2009) argues that the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia has not brought reconciliation, but instead facilitated co-
existence. Obstacles to reconciliation and to what is generally considered as ‘positive 
peace’ remain, and can turn into drivers of conflict, such as lack of contact between 
different ethnic groups, high levels of mistrust, unconsolidated versions of war 
narratives, and a continued need for ‘truth-telling’, particularly in regard to missing 
people and denial of war crimes.  
However, the research provides no deep analysis - nor even data to allow for analysis 
- to establish what elements of a conflict have not been addressed in the attempts to 
resolve it and why. In work on Northern Ireland, continued sectarianism and 
community divisions are linked to a regeneration of these divides in the younger 
generation through continued separation. However, findings that show unintended 
consequences of reconciliation processes are also often drawn on flimsy assumptions 
of what attitudes used to be. Knox’s (2010) work on Northern Ireland fails to provide 
a baseline for what attitudes used to be before the peacebuilding process in Northern 
Ireland. With such data lacking and no control group it is impossible to establish 
whether the analysis of continued perception of division draws largely from the 
author’s own perception. Such assessments highlight the methodological challenge of 
capturing both perceptions as well as linking events to such perceptions over the long 
term.  
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The problematisation of the connection between justice and peace brings to light 
significant evidence gaps regarding the long-term benefits of the justice toolkit and 
operational directives. This can partly be explained with the timeliness of the debate: 
the concept of the justice toolkit in conflict resolution is still relatively new. 
Furthermore, methods to test perceptions of justice are generally rather vague and 
narrative-driven.  
The disconnect between theory and practice in testing assumptions is striking. 
Empirical local-level data tends to be used to outline the complexity of an issue, 
whereas theoretical papers, such as Johansson’s (2010) work on peace and 
repatriation, provide strong conceptual statements, but fail to link these to reality. 
Breidlid (2010) makes an important contribution by showing that education is needed 
to reshape Sudanese notions of ‘the other’, including political realities of ‘the other’, 
if peace is to be established. Yet what kind of educational measures might be able to 
change narratives of perception and reality remains an open question.69 
Another obvious gap is the end-user experience of conflict resolution in all its private 
and localised complexity. A few studies stand out and help to locate the missing 
evidence: Bruck and Schindler (2009) argue that the impact of violence on the 
household is still largely under-researched, and thus government or international 
actors fail to understand what might be an important perspective on how 
programming could have an effect on the very local end-user level. A different take 
on the limited attention paid to the end-user perspective comes from Sahovic (2007) 
in his study on international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Drawing on 
Cultural Theory of Risk, he argues that international interventions were based on 
individualistic or egalitarian solidarities, a notion that suggests an end-user focus. 
However, the social reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of hierarchy, with a need 
for leadership and top-down control. In the disconnect it becomes evident that the 
end-user perspective was disregarded. 
Conclusions 
This paper has focused on the evidence base of literature generated by a systematic 
literature review on whether conflict resolution approaches have been effective in 
improving the lives of end-users in countries with an experience of armed conflict. It 
has demonstrated that conflict response frameworks have failed to keep up with 
empirical realities. While violent conflicts are increasingly complex, networked, and 
transnational, the existing models of conflict resolution remain inward looking, binary, 
and state-centric and hence often fail to effectively deal with the vulnerabilities and 
insecurities of the daily lives of people affected by violent conflict. It is thus difficult 
not to conclude that in the last two decades, non-state actors, informal arrangements, 
and complex security environments have stressed and challenged existing conflict 
resolution approaches. Despite notable advances that academic literature has made in 
certain areas of the conflict resolution field, the empirical knowledge base supporting 
the scholarship has overall been insufficiently robust. In particular, based on the 
findings from the literature reviewed, there is a need to pursue further research into, 
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and strengthen the evidence base of, three inter-related topics which are under-
theorised, poorly-understood, or both. Namely:  
1. the changing nature of conflict and its diverse origins and manifestations;  
2. the conflict networks that emerge and develop through bargaining in the 
political marketplace;  
3. the resulting (and often hybrid) governance and authority structures.  
Violent conflicts have complex architectures that often extend beyond the most 
obvious belligerents. Thus, the structure of a particular conflict - the salient 
configurations of actors and their inter-linkages - presents challenges for peace 
processes and peacebuilding strategies. The prevalent conflict responses treat conflict 
actors as atomistic when they are in fact embedded in a variety of social, economic, 
and security networks that may well transcend national boundaries. The revolving 
door of fighters going in and out of failed DDR programmes is ample evidence of our 
inability to capture this complexity effectively in our conflict responses.70  
The literature we have reviewed provides little evidence that the interventions of 
international and multilateral actors reflect (let alone understand) the complex 
architectures of many contemporary conflicts. The papers surveyed do not engage to 
any great extent in analysis of the conflicts they address. It is not that researchers are 
not aware of this complexity, but rather that we lack the evidence and the cognitive 
frameworks to guide the policy response in a manner that is congruent with the 
complexity of conflict and therefore effective in its mitigation and resolution. The 
now infamous U.S. military PowerPoint slide used in a 2010 briefing to depict the 
complexity of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan71 - a slide described by journalists as 
looking instead like ‘a bowl of spaghetti’ and which led General Stanley McChrystal 
to quip, ‘When we understand that slide we’ll have won the war’ - stands as a stark 
example of our continued inability to integrate complexity into conflict responses, 
even when we recognise that such complexity exists.  
The changing nature of war/trends in violent conflict 
There is an emerging consensus that the key to understanding violent conflict is an 
acknowledgment of the diversity of its forms and origins. Attempts to produce 
classifications based on neat conceptual boundaries have been unable adequately to 
represent this diversity. Substantial debates in scholarly literature have dealt with the 
issue of root causes, motives, and incentives for violent conflict, only to underline 
their complex, variable, and dynamic nature. The debates on what counts as a violent 
conflict given the increasingly thin line between political and non-political violence, 
the instrumentality of violence, how conflict evolves and what drives it, and why 
there is less of it today according to some studies, have been less developed. This is 
despite the prominent currency that the war-peace continuum has gained in conflict 
resolution debates and major implications of this realisation for rethinking conflict 
and peace, and formulating appropriate responses to conflict resolution. The gap in 
the conflict resolution literature is paralleled by perennially unreliable or disputed 
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evidence on the incidence of and the trends in armed conflicts presented by various 
sources, given that the data collection is impaired in the armed conflict setting, 
leading to potential misrepresentations.  
Additional research is needed into how violent conflict is understood by its various 
protagonists (particularly end-users), the implications for measuring violence, and to 
formulate more effective responses from the end-user perspective. To better 
understand what drives armed conflicts, more in-depth empirical evidence is needed 
on how various actors, at various levels of analysis (from the very local, to the 
national, to the regional and international), are interconnected in different regional 
and geopolitical contexts. There is a tendency to ‘pathologise’ local populations and 
view ordinary people as primarily victims of armed violence. In fact, the evidence of 
the actual experience of armed violence by the civilian population and various 
strategies used to cope, resist, or take advantage of ensuing violence and implications 
in terms of conflict persistence is rather thin. 
In addition, while much of the qualitative literature argues that the nature of conflict is 
changing and is context-specific, this is not meant to privilege local-level analysis. In 
fact, it is the connection between and among levels of analysis and the networks that 
connect them that are now the context. Moreover, a significant portion of quantitative 
analyses use methods of quantifying conflict that do not reflect this, which opens up 
new avenues for research. This could explore available data incorporating more in-
country variation, variation over time, or network analysis and mapping. It would also 
be useful to investigate whether various methods of quantifying conflict paint 
different pictures of where conflict is most intense. In line with our end-user focus, 
there is a need to develop and apply more end-user-centric methods of quantifying 
conflict that can be used in quantitative analyses.  
Networks, bargaining, and the political marketplace  
The literature we have surveyed is representative of the prevailing thinking in 
mainstream social science which associates contemporary armed conflicts with state 
fragility both as a source as well as a consequence of war. A fragile state is defined as 
a deviation from a developmental or capable norm, i.e. by what it is not. Scholarly 
and policymaking interest in conflict resolution in such a state is confined to putting it 
‘back’ on a developmental path as a way of resolving conflict dynamics. In the 
context of contemporary conflict and hybrid governance arrangements, the ‘political 
marketplace’ paradigm is plausibly a more fruitful approach to understand how such 
hybrid governance structures  actually function, how they come about, and in which 
direction the existing forms of public authority are  heading - which may not be 
towards ‘normal’ statehood at all. On the contrary, the forces by which poorer 
countries are incorporated into the global economy on subordinate terms, may 
generate conditions under which they become fixed as actors within integrated, 
regionalised, rentier marketplaces.  
The rentier political marketplace state, a sub-category of the broader phenomenon of 
the ‘political marketplace’ state, is one in which members of the elite bargain for 
position within a system run on patronage lines. This is a historically common 
phenomenon, usually described as a patrimonial system. In several regions of the 
world today, a specific configuration of this has developed, in which the ruler 
appropriates sufficient income from mineral and/or sovereign and aid rents (including 
crime) to be able to finance the governing apparatus without extracting resources 
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from the domestic productive base. In this case, the transaction becomes one in which 
the ruler pays in return for the intermediate elites providing loyalty. Unable to bargain 
on the basis of providing or withholding domestic resources, the intermediate elites 
utilise violence (or the threat thereof) and challenges to the legitimacy of the state as 
instruments for bargaining.  
Existing evidence could benefit from greater comparative analyses of models of 
political bargaining, decision making, the use of violence in political systems, and 
particularly dynamic patronage marketplaces and networks, because they demonstrate 
the potential of this system to overwhelm an institutionalised state or to develop into a 
regionalised phenomenon. Thus, we need a greater understanding of how actors act 
not in isolation but within complex linkages that facilitate bargaining with other 
actors in the political marketplace, and how these negotiated patronage and other 
networks shape authority structures and in turn impact the end-user.   
Hybrid governance and authority 
Both this paper and the JSRP evidence paper on resource governance72 found that 
limited information exists on the governance capacity and performance of non-state 
armed groups. Few studies have been conducted on their provision of basic public 
services such as security and justice and their attempts to involve civilians living in 
the territories they control in their own governance frameworks. So while rebel 
governance is recognised in the literature as a key aspect of contemporary conflict, its 
linkages and relationship with other aspects of conflict, including local populations, 
resources, the state, and interventions (external or internal), and its local 
embeddedness, are poorly understood. This, despite the role armed groups and other 
non-state actors play in shaping and re-shaping public authority. 
Much of the discourse remains focused on the economic functions of violence and the 
economic agendas of actors, particularly non-state actors, to the exclusion of political 
grievances against the state or rival groups.73 Yet, there is evidence that insurgencies, 
customary authorities, and other non-state actors often use powerful narratives of 
political grievance to assert new claims on state authority, and some even assume 
governance functions of the state in territories they control; they do not simply pursue 
economic interests. However, we know little about how rebel groups in particular 
work with customary and other authority structures, and the implications of this for 
the end-user. Some insurgency groups may provide key public goods within 
territories that they control, (e.g., security, local administrative elections, and control 
over corrupt local clandestine networks), and thus may enjoy positive relations with 
end-users in their local communities, but engage in predation when outside them. It 
may well be in a rebel movement’s economic interest to provide public goods. Yet 
motivations for war are more often dealt with than motivations for peace. For 
example, what changes the motivation of a disenfranchised youth in Liberia, 
portrayed in Mats Utas (2003)’s work, to a disenfranchised youth more interested in 
peace than in joining a rebel group to fight disenfranchisement? What then, is the 
                                                 
72
 See the JSRP evidence paper on Resources, Conflict and Governance, which addresses some of 
these issues in greater depth. 
73
 The ‘greed over grievance’ debate has helped move attention away from the irrationality or the 
senselessness of war and highlighted important and previously missing elements in these 
conflicts by drawing attention to economic interests and the political economies of modern 
warfare. Yet, it has since swung to another extreme by over-emphasising explanations of violence 
focused on direct material gain and the political economies of war.  
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evidence that violent opposition/rebel/insurgency movements have created local 
hybrid administrations that have been responsive to their end-users? What are the 
implications of this for peace processes?  Most of these questions remain 
unconsidered, and all remain unanswered, in the literature we surveyed. 
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